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YOUR PAPERS, PLEASE: POLICE
AUTHORITY TO REQUEST
IDENTIFICATION FROM A
PASSENGER DURING A TRAFFIC
STOP IN ALASKA
PATRICIA HAINES
INTRODUCTION
Alaska’s Constitution explicitly recognizes a right to privacy.1 This
Article examines Alaska’s right to privacy in the context of a police
officer’s authority to request identification from a passenger during a
routine traffic stop.
Take, for example, this potential scenario: a police officer stops a
vehicle for a routine traffic offense, such as a non-functioning license
plate light. There is no doubt that the officer has authority to stop a
vehicle in such circumstances; the officer has personally observed an
infraction of the traffic code. Nothing about the observed infraction,
however, implicates a passenger of the vehicle in any unlawful activity.
During the stop, the officer requests identification from all passengers
because of a standard investigative practice to make a blanket request in
all traffic stops. Once the officer obtains the passenger’s identification,
the officer runs her name and information through the state law
enforcement database system, checking for outstanding warrants and
any parole or probationary status. Occasionally, the request yields
information that permits the officer to arrest an individual who
otherwise has done nothing indicative of criminal activity and merely
had the misfortune to be sitting next to someone who failed to


Assistant district attorney in Fairbanks, Alaska; former law clerk to the
Honorable Michael A. MacDonald of the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska. Special thanks to Judge MacDonald. This article would not have been
possible without his mentoring, encouragement, and insight. Any opinions
expressed in this Article are those of the author. This Article is not a policy
statement of the Criminal Division of the State of Alaska, Department of Law.
1. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed.”).
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illuminate their license plate light.
The United States Supreme Court has gradually expanded the
authority of police officers over both drivers and passengers during
routine traffic stops. During a traffic stop, police officers may inquire
into matters unrelated to the stop, order drivers and passengers to exit
the vehicle,2 and conduct a pat down search of both the driver and any
passenger if the officer reasonably concludes that the individual is
armed and dangerous.3 Although the issue of requesting a passenger’s
identification has never been squarely presented to the Supreme Court,
many jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have ruled that police
may also request identification and run a criminal background check on
passengers as a routine matter in every traffic stop.4
However, the Alaska Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution,
explicitly guarantees the right to privacy.5 This constitutional provision
establishes a limit to police authority not found at the federal level or in
most other states. With that in mind, this Article examines whether the
Alaska Constitution permits a police officer to request identification
from a passenger during a routine traffic stop when the request is not
related to the justification for the stop, when the officer has no
reasonable suspicion of criminality, and when no other circumstances
indicate a legitimate need to obtain identification. Part I begins by
examining the law in other jurisdictions, including the federal courts
and the courts of other states that have addressed the issue. Part II then
examines whether the additional privacy protections found in the
Alaska Constitution, as applied and interpreted by Alaska courts,
impose a limit on police authority to ask for a passenger’s identification.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the Alaska Constitution does not
allow law enforcement officers to request identification from passengers
in a vehicle during a routine traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of
criminality or other circumstantial justification for the request.

I. OVERVIEW OF LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed whether a
police officer may request identification from, or conduct a criminal
background check on, passengers in a vehicle during a routine traffic
stop absent reasonable suspicion of criminality. Every United States

2. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam);
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
3. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111–12; Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009).
4. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
5. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
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Circuit Court to address the issue has found that the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution allows both the request
for identification and the criminal check, as long as the underlying
traffic stop is not unreasonably extended. 6 State courts that have
addressed the issue have approved various outcomes under their own
constitutions, from allowing requests for identification and criminal
checks as a matter of course, 7 to allowing officers to request
identification but not run criminal checks,8 to forbidding any questions
about a passenger’s identity. 9 The Alaska Supreme Court has not
decided the issue under the Alaska Constitution.
A.

Routine Traffic Stops and Terry v. Ohio

Both Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures.10 The United States Supreme Court
recently confirmed that a traffic stop qualifies as a seizure, reasoning
that the driver and passengers are effectively seized for the duration of
the stop.11
An officer who personally observes a traffic infraction has probable
cause for a traffic stop.12 Routine traffic stops, even those supported by

6. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (noting that every circuit to
address the issue has found no Fourth Amendment violation when an officer
requests passenger identification and conducts a criminal check).
7. See infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
behind allowing routine requests for passenger identification and accompanying
criminal checks).
8. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (discussing states that allow
requests for passenger identification but either have not addressed or do not
allow criminal checks).
9. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing states that
forbid routine requests for passenger identification).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14
(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other
property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated.”).
11. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (quoting Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007)).
12. See, e.g., Bessette v. State, 145 P.3d 592, 594 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006)
(ruling that officer had probable cause to stop defendant who was trying to start
a stalled snow machine on the sidewalk in violation of the traffic code); Williams
v. State, 853 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that trooper had
probable cause to stop defendant since evidence established that the driver was
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probable cause, are considered “a species of investigative stop rather
than a formal arrest.”13 The principles of Terry v. Ohio,14 a seminal case
that limited the scope and duration of investigative stops, therefore
mandate that “a traffic stop ‘must be temporary and [must] last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop’.”15 If a
police officer’s investigation exceeds these boundaries, either in
duration, manner, or scope, the stop becomes unreasonable and
constitutionally invalid.16
In the course of a traffic stop, it is not considered an unreasonable
search and seizure for a police officer to ask the driver to “produce
routine driving documents.” 17 Several state courts have identified a
driver’s license, proof of insurance, and the vehicle’s registration as
routine driving documents.18 A computer check to verify the validity of
routine driving documents does not unreasonably expand the scope or
duration of a valid traffic stop.19
Prior case law confirms the Supreme Court’s recent holding that a
traffic stop is a seizure that must comport with the principles of Terry v.
Ohio. 20 Accordingly, the scope and duration of the stop must not be
prolonged by police conduct unrelated to the stop.21 However, federal
and state courts have reached different conclusions regarding how these
principles apply when an officer conducts a check for outstanding

violating taillight regulations).
13. Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440–41 (1984)).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. Brown, 182 P.3d at 625 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(plurality opinion)).
16. Id. at 625.
17. Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage, 112 P.3d 676, 678 (Alaska Ct. App.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Maldonado,
356 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2001)). The United States Supreme Court, in dicta, has
approved the practice of requesting identification from drivers during a routine
traffic stop. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (noting that during
routine traffic stops, “licenses and registration papers are subject to inspection”).
18. Clark, 112 P.3d at 678–79 (citing Chang v. State, 608 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2004)); State v. Prince, 101 P.3d 332, 334 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004); Maysonet
v. State, 91 S.W.3d 365, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Hoang, 6 P.3d 602,
606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Campbell v. State, 97 P.3d 781, 785 (Wyo. 2004).
19. See Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (“By
calling dispatch to check on the status of the license, [the officer] did not
unreasonably expand the scope or duration of the stop.”) (internal citations
omitted).
20. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (internal citations
omitted) (“The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop
entails a seizure of the driver even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief.”).
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968).

HAINES_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

12/9/2012 5:54 PM

REQUESTING PASSENGER ID

265

warrants on the passenger’s identification during a traffic stop.
B.

Rights of Passengers Under Federal Law

The United States Supreme Court’s recent holding that a traffic stop
constitutes a seizure applies to both the driver as well as all
passengers.22 Because a traffic stop impacts a passenger’s constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable seizures, a passenger has standing to
challenge an illegal stop or the unreasonable expansion of an initially
lawful stop.23
The Court has found that routine traffic stops “resemble, in
duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in
Terry.”24 However, given the potential dangers of traffic stops, the Court
determined that officers can minimize the risk of harm to police and the
occupants of a vehicle if they take unquestioned control of the
situation. 25 Because of the inherent dangers present in routine traffic
stops, the Court has allowed officers to take additional protective
measures.26
Four Supreme Court decisions cumulatively apply and clarify Terry
in a traffic-stop setting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms,27 Maryland v. Wilson,28
Brendlin v. California,29 and Arizona v. Johnson.30
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court addressed the question of
whether ordering the driver to get out of the car after a lawful stop “was
reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment.”31 When
an officer stopped Mimms for an expired license plate, the officer
noticed a bulge under Mimms’ jacket.32 Fearful for his safety, the officer
frisked Mimms and discovered a loaded revolver. 33 Mimms was
immediately arrested.34 In assessing the constitutionality of the officer’s
actions, the Court addressed the reasonableness of the officer’s actions,

22. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009).
23. Id.
24. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984).
25. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (quoting Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981)).
26. See, e.g., Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330–32 (discussing Supreme Court
precedents authorizing officer safety measures during traffic stops).
27. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
28. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
29. 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
30. 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
31. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109.
32. Id. at 107.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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weighing the need to protect an officer’s safety with an individual’s
right to “personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.”35 Because of the potential risks and dangers an officer faces
approaching a person seated in an automobile, the Court found it
reasonable to allow officers to avoid unnecessary risks in the course of
duty. 36 The Court reasoned that the public interest in officer safety
outweighed such a “de minimis” intrusion into the driver’s personal
liberty. 37 The Court held that it is constitutional for police officers to
order a driver out of his vehicle. Furthermore, the Court held that an
officer may conduct a pat down search of the driver if the officer
reasonably concludes that the driver “might be armed and presently
dangerous.”38
Maryland v. Wilson extended the Mimms rule to apply to passengers
as well as drivers.39 Wilson was a passenger in a vehicle being pursued
for speeding and tag violations.40 During the pursuit, the officer noticed
that Wilson kept nervously looking out the window, then ducking down
and disappearing before popping his head back up.41 Upon stopping the
vehicle, the officer noticed that Wilson was nervous and sweaty.42 When
Wilson exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground.43 In
extending the Mimms rule to allow officers to order passengers to exit
the vehicle during a traffic stop, the Court again emphasized concerns
for officers’ safety during traffic stops.44 The Court noted that while both
drivers and passengers can pose dangers to police officers, there is an
increased intrusion on passengers’ personal liberty, since there is less
probable cause or reason to stop or detain a passenger, who, unlike the

35. Id. at 109.
36. Id. at 110 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)). The Court cited a
study showing that “approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a
police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Id. (citing Allen P.
Bristow, Police Officer Shootings – A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 93, 93 (1963)). The Court acknowledged “that not all these assaults
occur when issuing traffic summons, but we have before expressly declined to
accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to
officers than other types of confrontations.” Id. (citing United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)). “Indeed, it appears ‘that a significant percentage of
murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.’” Id.
(quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5).
37. Id. at 111.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 410–11.
43. Id. at 411.
44. Id. at 413.
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driver, has not committed a vehicular offense. 45 Nevertheless, the only
change in the passenger’s circumstance occurs in ordering the passenger
to step outside the vehicle because the passenger was already detained
by the traffic stop.46 The Court posited that ordering passengers to get
out of a stopped car may prevent them from accessing concealed
weapons inside the vehicle.47 Furthermore, the Court recognized that
any threat to officer safety during a traffic stop arises not out of the
driver’s fear of receiving a traffic ticket, but from the possibility of a
more serious crime being uncovered during the stop.48 Passengers and
drivers alike may be motivated to inflict violence on an officer under
those circumstances. 49 Taking into account these considerations, the
Court held that an officer may order passengers to exit a car during a
traffic stop.50
Recently, Brendlin v. California held that passengers are seized to the
same extent as a driver during a routine traffic stop, and therefore they
have standing to “challenge the constitutionality of a stop.”51 Brendlin
was a passenger in a vehicle during a traffic stop. 52 Suspecting that
Brendlin had dropped out of parole supervision, the police officers
asked him to identify himself. 53 When reinforcements arrived, the
officers ordered Brendlin out of the car and placed him under arrest.54
Brendlin, the driver, and the car all possessed items used for the
production of methamphetamine. 55 In its reasoning, the Court
acknowledged that drivers and passengers alike are curtailed by a traffic
stop and the intrusion on privacy does not distinguish between drivers
and passengers. 56 Accordingly, passengers have equal standing to
challenge a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable
passenger in a car that has just been stopped by police would
understand that the police officer’s control of the situation prevented
them from exiting the car without police permission.57 He would not
“have believed himself free to ‘terminate the encounter’ between the

45. Id. The Court cited statistics to prove that “traffic stops may be
dangerous encounters.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 413–14.
47. Id. at 414.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007).
52. Id. at 252.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 257.
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police and himself;” consequently, a passenger is seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop.58
Finally, in Arizona v. Johnson, the Supreme Court applied Terry to
pat downs during traffic stops. 59 Johnson was a passenger in an
automobile pulled over for an expired registration.60 During the traffic
stop, an officer noticed Johnson was nervous and observed several signs
that Johnson might have been involved in criminal activity.61 For his
safety, the officer conducted a pat down, during which he discovered a
gun.62 Applying the holding in Terry that to move from a stop to a frisk
the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the stopped person is
armed and dangerous, the Court ruled the pat down during the traffic
stop lawful.63
In summary, without offending the Fourth Amendment, a lawful
traffic stop allows police officers to: inquire “into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop”;64 “order the driver to get out of the
vehicle”;65 “order passengers to get out of the car”;66 conduct a pat down
search of the driver if the officer reasonably concludes that the driver is
armed and dangerous;67 and conduct a pat down search of a passenger if
the officer reasonably concludes that the passenger is armed and
dangerous.68
The Supreme Court has also upheld the constitutionality of “stop
and identify” statutes.69 State laws requiring suspects to state their name
during a valid Terry stop have been upheld as consistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.70
The request for a suspect’s name is directly related “to the purpose,
rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. The threat of criminal
sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a

58. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)).
59. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 324, 331 (2009).
60. Id. at 327.
61. See id. at 328 (observing clothing and behavior consistent with gang or
criminal activity and weapon possession).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 327, 329.
64. Id. at 333.
65. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam).
66. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
67. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112.
68. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327.
69. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humbolt Cnty., 542 U.S.
177, 187–88 (2004) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2003)) (upholding a
2003 Nevada statute that required any person lawfully detained to “identify
himself, but [the person] may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of
any peace officer”).
70. Id. at 187-88.
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legal nullity.”71 Further, the request does not directly change the stop
itself in terms of duration or location. 72 The Court noted that Terry
imposed certain limitations on an investigative stop, requiring that the
stop be “justified at its inception and ‘reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified’ the initial stop.”73 Under these principles,
an officer cannot arrest a suspect for failing to produce identification if
the officer’s purpose in asking for identification does not bear a
reasonable relation to the purpose of the stop.74
In response to the argument that a statute requiring disclosure of
one’s identity to a police officer violates the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination, the Court declined to address
whether the privilege applies when “furnishing identity at the time of a
stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed
to convict the individual of a separate offense.”75 The Court instead held
more narrowly that the Fifth Amendment did not apply where
“petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any
articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to
incriminate him, or that it ‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute’ him.”76 The petitioner refused to reveal his identity
simply because he felt the officer was not entitled to know his name, not
because he saw any possibility or reason that his name would be used
against him in a criminal case. 77 Although the court acknowledged
“petitioner’s strong belief that he should not have to disclose his
identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada
Legislature’s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the
disclosure would tend to incriminate him.”78 Nevada is one of many

71. Id. at 188. (internal citations omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
75. Id. at 191.
76. Id. at 190 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
77. Id. at 190–91.
78. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that disclosing his name would
be the key link in the chain of evidence that would lead to his prosecution, thus
implicating the Fifth Amendment) (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486). Nevada is
not the only state with a “stop and identify” statute. At least twenty-three other
states have similar statutes: ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2412 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (2012); COLO. REV. STAT §
16-3-103(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, §§ 1902(a), 1321(6) (2012); FLA. STAT. §
856.021(2) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36(b) (2012); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/107-14 (2012); IND. CODE § 34-28-5-3.5 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1)
(2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 215.1(A) (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. §
84.710(2) (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29829 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (Lexis 2012); N.M. STAT. § 30-22-3
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states with stop and identify statutes. 79
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
whether a police officer can request identification from passengers and
run a criminal background check without any reasonable suspicion of
criminality, every United States Circuit Court to address the issue has
answered in the affirmative.80
C.

State Split: Passengers’ Rights

Alaska’s appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the
request for identification from a passenger in a vehicle during a routine
traffic stop is permitted under the state constitution. Other state courts
around the country are split on the question.
The majority of states that have decided this issue have concluded
that the police may request identification from a passenger and may run
a criminal background check in a traffic stop without violating any
Fourth Amendment rights, but the requests and background checks
must not unreasonably prolong the stop. 81 State courts that allow

(2012); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21
(2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.29 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1
(2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 1983
(Supp. 2012); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2012). Some municipalities also have “stop and
identify” statutes. See, e.g., Arlington Cnty, Va. Code § 17-13(c) (1957). For
background on “stop and identify” statutes and their impact on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Peter Koclanes, Unreasonable Seizure:
“Stop and Identify” Statutes Create an Illusion of Safety by Sacrificing Real Privacy, 57
FLA. L. REV. 431 (2005); James G. Warner, Dudley Do Wrong: An Analysis of a “Stop
in Identify” Statute in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 39 AKRON
L. REV. 245 (2006); William H. Weisman, Where Everybody Knows Your Name:
Compulsory Identification and the Fallacy of the Hiibel Majority, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
1421 (2006); James L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest
Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme
Court’s Decision to Compel Identification, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449 (2005); Note, Stop
and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12
RUTGERS L.J. 585 (1981); Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson:
Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1057 (1984).
79. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2011).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 2012 WL 48214, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan.
10, 2012); United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Chaney, 584 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Stufflebeam v. Harris, 521 F.3d 884, 888
(8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Kirksey, 485 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1085–86 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Soriano-Jarquin,
492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1278–79
(11th Cir. 2001).
81. See, e.g., State v. Ybarra, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
State v. Curiel, 634 P.2d 988, 992 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)) (holding that a request for
identification and warrant check on a passenger is “incidental to the authorized
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officers to request identification from a passenger during a traffic stop
justify the request in a variety of ways, including: (1) that a request for
passenger identification is not a “search” or “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment or comparable state constitutions;82 (2) that the request is
justified by legitimate concerns for officer safety;83 (3) that the request is

investigatory stop”); People v. Vibanco, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that a request for a passenger’s identification and a criminal
background check is permissible as long as they do not prolong the stop); People
v. Bowles, 226 P.3d 1125, 1129–30 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding that a request for a
passenger’s identification and a criminal check is permissible as long as the
passenger produces the identification voluntarily); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169,
1172–73 (Del. 2010) (holding that, as part of a routine traffic stop, police officers
may request a passenger’s identification and run a criminal background check as
long as detention is not unreasonably prolonged); State v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d
151, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a request for a passenger’s
identification is part of a routine traffic stop); People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947,
957–58, 963 (Ill. 2008) (holding that a warrant check on passengers is permissible
so long as check does not unnecessarily prolong the stop and the stop is
conducted reasonably); Cade v. State, 872 N.E.2d 186, 188–89 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that a request for identification from a passenger is a minimal
intrusion if the traffic stop was valid); see also State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542,
546–47 (Iowa 2004); State v. Hoskins, No. 07-5-1843-1845, 2008 WL 1926727, at *3
(N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008); State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 804 (N.J. 2008);
People v. Jones, 779 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); State v. Morgan,
2002 WL 63196, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2002); Commonwealth v. Campbell,
862 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Roberson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 642, 646
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1994); State v.
Collins, No. CRF 2010 13041, at *9–21 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Oct. 5, 2010) (discussing
numerous reasons why a request for a passenger’s identification is permissible,
including officer safety, the minimal nature of the intrusion, necessity in
completing a seatbelt citation, and the consensual nature of the encounter).
82. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 919 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(“A police officer’s request to a defendant for his identification does not
constitute detention or seizure” (citing Holden v. State, 877 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004))); State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 2004) (holding
that a passenger questioned by police was not “seized” under the Fourth
Amendment because “a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the
deputy’s request for his ID”); State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 803 (N.J. 2008)
(holding that a criminal records check “is not a search under the federal or state
constitutions”); State v. Morgan, 2002 WL 63196, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18,
2002) (“[a] request for identification . . . is ordinarily characterized as a
consensual encounter, not a custodial search”) (citing State v. Osborne, 1995 WL
737913, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995)).
83. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“The
presence of passengers in a stopped vehicle increases the officers’ risks. . . .
These risks create a strong interest in officer safety that justifies reasonable safety
measures that minimally intrude upon the Fourth Amendment privacy
expectations of motorists.” (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15
(1997))). Cade v. State, 872 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]hen police
officers have been requested as part of their duties to interact with an individual,
they should be free to verify that that person does not have known or suspected
dangerous propensities. This goal can be accomplished by checking the person’s
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part of the investigation into the traffic violation; 84 and (4) that the
request stems from the officer’s need to collect information about
witnesses to a traffic stop.85
Some state courts allow officers to request identification from
passengers where circumstances warrant it, but deny performing
blanket criminal checks because such checks are inappropriate without
reasonable suspicion.86 However, some state courts do not permit
criminal checks of passengers because they measurably extend the stop
which would convert the stop into an unlawful seizure.87
name against law enforcement records.” (quoting Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d
980, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006))).
84. See, e.g., State v. Ybarra, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that a request for identification and warrant check on a passenger is “incidental
to the authorized investigatory stop” (citing State v. Curiel, 634 P.2d 988, 992
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Del. 2010) (holding that
an officer did “not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop by
asking [a] passenger for identification and then running a background check”);
State v. Gutierrez, 611 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (“A reasonable
investigation of a traffic stop may include asking for a driver’s license and
registration, requesting a driver to sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver
about his or her destination and purpose. An officer may engage in similar
routine questioning of the vehicle’s passengers.” (citing U.S. v. Johnson, 58 F.3d
356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995))); St. George v. State, 197 S.W.3d 806, 819, 822–23 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (“merely asking for a passenger’s identity or identification
during a routine traffic stop does not require separate reasonable suspicion as to
the passenger,” but warrant checks on passengers, as opposed to drivers, are not
such a routine component of traffic stops as to justify prolonging the stop).
85. See State v. Hoskins, 2008 WL 1926727, at *4 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 7,
2008) (“Since passengers in the vehicle are witnesses to the behavior of both the
officer and the driver, it is only prudent for the officer to ask for their identities
so that their presence can be documented and they can be contacted later should
the need arise.”) (citing State v. Brunelle, 766 A.2d 272, 274 (2000)); State v.
Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72, 81 (Wis. 2000) (“[T]here is a general public interest in
attempting to obtain identifying information from witnesses to police-citizen
encounters.”)
86. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 510–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(rejecting the idea that obtaining contact information of witnesses justifies a
warrant check); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(c) (4th ed. 2004) (opining that all passenger criminal
checks are inappropriate except when (i) the police has reasonable, articulable
suspicions that a passenger has committed a crime, (ii) the passenger has
violated a traffic law, or (iii) when the passenger must drive the vehicle
following the detainment of the original driver).
87. See, e.g., In re M.K.W., 2010 WL 4977141, at *2–3 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 12,
2010) (finding warrant checks on a passenger unconstitutional when they
measurably extended the length of the stop); see also Piggott v. Commonwealth,
537 S.E.2d 618, 619–20 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that although the request for
identification was not a search or seizure, retaining the identification while
running a warrant check constituted a seizure and was not valid absent
reasonable suspicion), abrogated by McCain v. Commonwealth, 545 S.E.2d 541,
546 (Va. 2001).
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Several courts have held that their own state law does not permit
police to request identification from passengers absent reasonable
suspicion or other circumstantial justification. 88 For instance, the
Washington Supreme Court held that its state constitution’s privacy
clause “prohibits law enforcement officers from requesting identification
from passengers for investigative purposes unless there is an
independent reason that justifies the request.”89

II. ALASKA’S LEGACY OF PRIVACY
Although the United States Constitution establishes minimum
required protections of individual rights, the Alaska Constitution often
provides greater protections for liberty and privacy interests.90 Article I,
Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, like the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 91 But unlike the United States Constitution, the Alaska

88. See, e.g., State v. Thompkin, 143 P.3d 530, 534–36 (Ore. 2006) (holding
that the “defendant was unlawfully seized under Article I, section 9” of the
Oregon Constitution); State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) (“Once [the police] determined that appellant did not have a driver’s
license and was not taking any responsibility for the vehicle, requesting
appellant’s identification, with no suspicion of criminal activity, and then taking
that identification to run a warrants check was a fishing expedition, thus,
unreasonable.”); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 692 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998) (finding that a request for identification from a passenger “without an
objective basis for suspicion that the passenger is involved in criminal activity,
slips into the dragnet category of questioning that the Massachusetts
Constitution] prohibits” (citing Commonwealth v. Torres, 674 N.E.2d 638, 641–
43 (Mass. 1996))); People v. Spicer, 157 Cal. App. 3d 213, 617–19 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (recognizing that “the fact [that] the restraint on [the passenger’s] liberty
was minimal does not make the restraint a reasonable one,” and holding that
“[i]n circumstances pregnant with coercion” where the passenger “was
confronted by a uniformed officer almost immediately after the car in which she
was riding was stopped” and the officer requested her identification “[w]ithout
any explanation or prefatory remarks,” the officer’s “direct request [that] the
defendant search for and produce a document . . . amounts to an unlawful
seizure”).
89. State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 207 (Wash. 2004) (holding that “officers
[may] engage passengers in conversation. . . . [but when the] interaction
develops into an investigation, it runs afoul of [the] state constitution unless
there is justification for the intrusion”).
90. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 245 (Alaska 2006)
(stating that the “[court has] specifically recognized that Alaska’s guarantee of
privacy is broader than the federal constitution’s”).
91. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other
property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14. The Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is virtually identical, although the Alaska provision
adds the words “and other property.”
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Constitution also contains an explicit right to privacy.92 Article I, Section
22 of the Alaska Constitution states: “The right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed.”93 The effect of Article I, Section
22 is to make privacy a specifically enumerated right in Alaska.94 The
Alaska Constitution’s express protection of privacy has been interpreted
by Alaska courts to protect citizens against “unwanted intrusions by the
State” in a manner that is more expansive than the privacy right
protected under the federal constitution.95
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy
granted by Article I, Section 22 can be used as a justification for giving
the search protections of § 14 a “liberal interpretation.”96 The Alaska
Supreme Court has also warned that “[f]ederal decisions dealing with
the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution . . . should
not be regarded as determinative of the scope of Alaska’s right to
privacy amendment, since no such express right is contained in the
United States Constitution.”97 However, the Alaska Supreme Court has
at least considered the Supreme Court’s rulings on the Fourth
Amendment in addressing the constitutionality of investigative stops.98
Although federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the
92. See, e.g., Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148
(Alaska 1977) (emphasizing the Alaska Constitution’s explicit guarantee of
privacy).
93. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
94. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 501 (Alaska 1975) (noting that this
enumeration “does not, in and of itself, yield answers concerning what scope
should be accorded this right to privacy”); see also Jeffrey M. Kaban, Note,
Alaska, the Last Frontier of Privacy: Using the State Constitution to Eliminate
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1309, 1318 (2004) (noting the importance
of the right to privacy in finding broader rights under the state constitution).
95. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska 2007)
(quoting Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Alaska
1989)); Woods & Rhode, 565 P.2d at 149 (quoting Ravin, 537 P.2d at 514–15).
96. Wortham v. State, 641 P.2d 223, 224–25 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), aff’d,
666 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1983)); see also Shardul Desai, Note, Pretextual Searches and
Seizures: Alaska’s Failure to Adopt a Standard, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 235, 246 (2006)
(discussing the additional search and seizure protections present in Alaska due
to the express constitutional guarantee of privacy (citing Anchorage Police Dep’t
Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 23 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001))).
97. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874–75 (Alaska 1978).
98. For example, in Anchorage v. Cook, the court relied on the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, holding that “minimal intrusion
was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement and,
therefore, not violative of either the fourth amendment [or the Alaska
Constitution].” 598 P.2d 939, 942 (Alaska 1979). In Erickson v. State, the court
declined to follow the holding in Maryland v. Wilson that a police officer can
order the driver and the passengers out of a car that the officer has stopped for a
routine traffic violation, without need of any further justification, and narrowly
ruled on case-specific grounds. 141 P.3d 356, 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
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interpretation of the Alaska’s constitutional privacy right is persuasive,
it is not controlling; it is likely that in Alaska, as in Washington state,
law enforcement officers are prohibited from requesting identification
from passengers unless there is an independent reason that justifies the
request.
However, Alaska’s right to privacy is not absolute, 99 and the
request for a passenger’s identification could be justified after balancing
the detainee’s privacy interest with the countervailing state interests.
Alaska has found such requests reasonable where the officer has
reasonable suspicion of criminality, 100 the passenger has committed a
traffic infraction,101 or the passenger intends to take possession of the
vehicle after the driver’s arrest.102 But the right to privacy does protect
against indiscriminate requests for passenger identification where the
request cannot be justified as anything other than routine police
procedure.
A.

A Request for Identification from a Passenger Is a Seizure in
Alaska

When analyzing the constitutionality of a request for identification
from a passenger during a routine traffic stop under the Alaska
Constitution, courts must first determine whether the passenger was
seized when the police officer requested identification. If a search or
99. See Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974) (stating that privacy
may sometimes be held subordinate to the constitutional power to protect health
and welfare).
100. See, e.g., Hartman v. State, Dep’t of Admin., 152 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Alaska
2007) (finding that the police may make a stop if they have “a reasonable
suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or
property has recently occurred” (quoting Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46
(Alaska 1976))).
101. See, e.g., Marker v. State, 2006 WL 1720079, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. June
21, 2006) (finding that officers had authority to stop a vehicle and request
identification from both the driver and the passenger where both parties had
committed a traffic infraction by failing to wear a seatbelt); Larson v. State, 669
P.2d 1334, 1335–36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (finding that an officer was justified in
conducting an investigatory stop and demanding identification from a
passenger where the officer first observed the passenger driving the car
erratically, and then switching seats with another occupant of the car).
102. According to section 13.02.345(c) of the Alaska Administrative Code
(2012), police are authorized to release a vehicle to a person of the driver’s choice
in lieu of impoundment upon the driver’s arrest, so long as the proposed driver
is a legally licensed driver. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, tit. 13, § 13.02.345(c) (2012); see
also, McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 250 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (finding that
officers were authorized to request identification from a passenger who sought
to remove the driver’s property from a vehicle before the vehicle was
impounded).
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seizure did occur, the next step is to determine whether the request for
identification is within an exception to the warrant requirement.
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has held that
passengers are seized to the same extent as a driver during a routine
traffic stop. 103 In the majority opinion of Brendlin v. California, Justice
Souter noted that a passenger in a car that has just been stopped by
police would understand “the police officers to be exercising control to
the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police
permission.” 104 Since a reasonable person would not “have believed
himself free to ‘terminate the encounter’ between the police and
himself,” a passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment during a traffic stop.105
Thus a passenger is seized when the car in which he or she is riding
is stopped for a traffic violation. A reasonable person would not “believe
he or she was free to go” 106 when the police officer approaches the
vehicle, informs the occupants that the driver has committed a traffic
infraction, and asks for identification from the driver and all passengers.
Although the officer may be able to make the same request of a person
on the street without conducting a seizure, 107 there are significant
distinctions between pedestrians and automobile passengers. There is “a
greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile
than . . . by pedestrian or other modes of travel.”108 A passenger in an
automobile does not have the realistic option of simply walking away
when confronted by undesired police contact.109 Because a reasonable
person who is a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation
would not believe he or she is free to go when a police officer requests
identification, the passenger is seized by virtue of the stop. The request
for identification is not necessarily an additional seizure.

103. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 257–58 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)).
106. Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 364 (Alaska 1983).
107. See Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1306 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (“mere
request for identification does not automatically render the stop a seizure, where
it does not appear that the identification was retained for an unnecessarily long
time”). The key factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred is
“whether or not a reasonable person would believe he or she was free to go.”
Waring, 670 P.2d at 364. Because the average person would feel obligated to
respond to a police officer’s questions, an encounter amounts to a seizure only if
the police officer adds to those inherent pressures with conduct that a reasonable
person would view as threatening or offensive even if coming from another
private citizen. Id.
108. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
109. See State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 206 (Wash. 2004) (elaborating on the
rationale suggested in Prouse).
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But when there are greater privacy protections by virtue of a state
constitution’s privacy clause, greater expectations of privacy may make
the request for identification a search or seizure. In State v. Rankin,110 the
Washington Supreme Court held that because of the Washington
Constitution’s privacy clause, “passengers are unconstitutionally
detained when an officer requests identification ‘unless other
circumstances give the police independent cause to question [the]
passengers.’” 111 Because of the added protections of Washington’s
privacy clause, a police officer’s request for a passenger’s identification
violated the right of privacy unless the officer had an independent basis
for the request.112
As the Rankin court recognized, a state constitution’s privacy clause
may grant greater rights and create greater expectations of privacy.
Those higher expectations of privacy are present in Alaska.113 Although
some states have held that a request for identification is not a search or
seizure, 114 the additional privacy protections afforded by the Alaska
Constitution make such a finding inapposite in Alaska.
Because under the Alaska Constitution a request for identification
from a passenger during a traffic stop is a search and seizure, and
because the request is made without a warrant, the request must meet
an exception to the warrant requirement if it is to be constitutionally
permissible.
B.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

Warrantless searches and seizures are considered per se
unreasonable, and courts will uphold a warrantless search or seizure
only if it satisfies “one of the well-established and specifically defined

110. Id.
111. Id. at 205 (quoting State v. Larson, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (Wash. 1980)).
112. Id. at 203. “[T]he freedom from disturbance in ‘private affairs’ afforded to
passengers in Washington by article I, section 7 [of the Washington Constitution]
prohibits law enforcement officers from requesting identification from
passengers for investigative purposes unless there is an independent reason that
justifies the request.” Id. at 207.
113. See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581
(Alaska 2007) (discussing the more robust right to privacy guaranteed by the
Alaska Constitution as opposed to any federal right to privacy).
114. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s identity, and
therefore no unreasonable intrusion when an officer asks for a passenger’s
identification); State v. Gonzalez, 919 So.2d 702, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“A
police officer’s request to a defendant for his identification does not constitute
detention or seizure.”).
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exceptions to the warrant requirement.”115 The Alaska Supreme Court
has warned that “[i]nherent in the concept of ‘narrowly defined
exceptions’ is the requirement that a search conducted pursuant to such
an exception must be no broader or more intrusive than necessary to
fairly effect the governmental purpose which serves as its
justification.” 116 The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized the
following well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement:
 A search of abandoned property117
 A search in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon118
 A search to prevent the destruction of evidence119
 A search of a movable vehicle120
 A pre-incarceration inventory search121
 A search pursuant to voluntary consent122
 A search conducted for the purpose of rendering
emergency aid123
 A stop and frisk124

115. Gallmeyer v. State, 640 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
116. Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 735 (Alaska 1979) (internal citation
omitted) (finding the correctional officer’s “pat-down” was constitutional, but
the officer’s search of the balloon found on the individual exceeded the scope of
the search).
117. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 840 (Alaska 1975) (citing Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 240 (1960)) (remanding to find whether the search of an
intoxicated man’s wallet in a public tavern was incident to a lawful arrest).
118. Id. at 840 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967)).
119. Finch v. State, 592 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Alaska 1979) (“There must be
probable cause to believe that evidence is present, and the officers must
reasonably conclude, from the surrounding circumstances and the information
at hand, that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before a search warrant
can be obtained.”).
120. Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1262–63 (Alaska 1978) (finding that the
movable vehicle exception is essentially a subcategory of the destructible
evidence exception because vehicles may escape before a warrant is obtained).
121. Reeves, 599 P.2d at 735. (finding that inventory searches are appropriate
because the state wants (1) to prevent the entry of prohibited or dangerous items
into the jail, and (2) to secure the property of the arrestee for safe-keeping).
122. Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 167 (Alaska 1979) (finding defendant
voluntarily consented to search of his car). See Clark v. State, 231 P.3d 366, 367
(Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (internal citation omitted) (“The police may conduct a
warrantless search based on the voluntary consent of a person who has valid
control of the place to be searched.”).
123. Schraff, 544 P.2d at 841.
124. Free v. State, 614 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Alaska 1980) (finding pat-down search
for weapons was valid during an investigatory stop after receiving a reliable tip
about a potential armed robbery). See also State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (internal citations omitted) (“[A]n investigatory stop is
differentiated from an arrest on the basis of (1) its purpose, (2) the magnitude of
the intrusion, and (3) the quantum of information necessary to justify the
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A search incident to arrest125
A seizure of items in plain view126
A search of probationers or parolees authorized by the
conditions of probation or parole and conducted at the
direction of a probation or parole officer127
 A protective search128
Most of these exceptions do not logically apply when a law
enforcement official requests identification from a passenger. A
passenger’s identification is not abandoned property; the passenger is
not a fleeing felon; there is no danger of destruction of evidence; the
request is not part of an inventory search; there is no need for
emergency aid; the search is not conducted incident to arrest; the
identification is not in plain view; the officer would not know prior to
the request that the passenger was on probation; and the request was
not part of a protective search for dangerous persons. If any of the
exceptions did apply to the particular facts of a case, the request for
identification could be justified on a case-by-case basis rather than as
part of a general policy to make a blanket request for identification from
all passengers in all traffic stops.
Only the movable vehicle exception, voluntary consent, or a search
incident to a lawful investigative stop could justify a general policy of

intrusion, i.e., reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.”); State v.
Wagar, 79 P.3d 644, 647 n.4 (Alaska 2003) (internal citation omitted) (“Not every
legitimate stop can be accompanied by a frisk. What is needed is a reasonable
belief at the time of the initiation of the frisk that the suspect may be armed and
dangerous.”).
125. Crawford v. State, 138 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2006) (“Search incident to
lawful arrest allows the warrantless search of the area ‘within [the arrestee’s]
immediate control’ at the time of the arrest to ensure officer safety and to
preserve evidence related to the crime.”) (quoting McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127,
133 (Alaska 1971)).
126. Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Alaska 1973) (“An officer may seize
evidence which is legitimately in his plain sight.”).
127. Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1239–44 (Alaska 1977) (finding that
search of defendant under authority of parole officer was valid). See also Milton
v. State, 879 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (“A search by a probation
officer of a probationer’s residence is a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement as long as the search has been authorized by the conditions of
probation or release, the search is conducted by or at the direction of probation
authorities, and the search bears a direct relationship to the nature of the crime
for which the probationer was convicted.”).
128. Earley v. State, 789 P.2d 374, 376 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (“To satisfy the
protective search doctrine, the state must prove that: ‘(a) the officers must have
reasonable cause to believe that their safety is in danger before engaging in such
a search, and (b) the search must be narrowly limited to areas where they could
find dangerous persons.’”) (quoting Murdock v. State, 664 P.2d 589, 596 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1983)).
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making a warrantless request for identification from all passengers
during a traffic stop. Each is considered below.
1. Movable Vehicle Exception
Movable vehicle search cases are justified by the notion that
“warrantless searches must be tolerated because vehicles and evidence
contained in them might be removed before it is possible to obtain a
search warrant. Thus, the movable vehicle exception . . . may properly
be considered to be a subcategory of the destructible evidence
exception.”129 To qualify for the destructible evidence exemption, “(1)
[t]here must be probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
evidence or contraband and (2) there must be exigent circumstances
justifying conduct of the search without a warrant.”130
Neither requirement of the movable vehicle exception is met when
an officer requests identification from a passenger without
circumstantial justification. At the outset of a routine traffic stop, an
officer would have no suspicion, let alone probable cause, that anyone in
the vehicle other than the driver was engaged in unlawful activity.
Likewise, there would be no probable cause to believe that a vehicle
stopped for a traffic infraction contained evidence or contraband that
would be discovered by requesting a passenger’s identification. And at
the outset of such a routine traffic stop, there are no exigent
circumstances that would justify an immediate search without a
warrant. Because the movable vehicle exception does not justify blanket
searches of all cars and all passengers in all stops, it cannot justify a
blanket request for passenger identification in all stops.
2. Voluntary Consent
A warrantless search may be conducted pursuant to the voluntary
consent of an individual “who has valid control of the place to be
searched.”131 To prove voluntary consent, the State has the burden of
showing that consent was “unequivocal, specific and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.” 132 A person may
voluntarily consent to a search or seizure that would not otherwise
satisfy constitutional requirements.133

129. Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1262–63 (Alaska 1978).
130. Id. at 1263.
131. Clark v. State, 231 P.3d 366, 367 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); Nason v. State,
102 P.3d 966, 970–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
132. Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 167 (Alaska 1979) (quoting Erickson v. State,
507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973)); accord Phillips v. State, 625 P.2d 816, 817
(Alaska 1988).
133. Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
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When the State relies upon the consent exception, two main issues
must be determined: (1) whether the defendant actually consented, and
(2) whether the defendant did so with the requisite voluntariness.134 To
assess these issues, courts examine the totality of the circumstances.135
Mere “acquiescence to apparent lawful authority” does not constitute
voluntary, uncoerced consent to a warrantless search.136
In Brown v. State,137 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that under the
specific circumstances of that case, “the officer conducting the traffic
stop was prohibited from requesting [the defendant’s] permission to
conduct a search that was (1) unrelated to the basis for the stop and (2)
not otherwise supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminality.”138
The court refrained from deciding “whether Article I, Section 14 [of the
Alaska Constitution] should be interpreted to completely preclude
requests for searches during a routine traffic stop unless the search is
related to the ground for the stop or is otherwise supported by a
reasonable suspicion of criminality,” opting instead for a narrower
holding based on the “particularly egregious example” presented by
Brown’s case.139
Brown was stopped for an equipment violation, but she was never
informed of the reason for the stop.140 Brown did not know if she was
suspected of a minor traffic infraction or a more serious crime. 141
Without explanation, the trooper demanded Brown’s driver’s license,
and then he went back to his patrol vehicle.142 For all that Brown knew,
the trooper might have been verifying her identity in preparation for
arresting her.
When the trooper returned to Brown’s car, he still refrained from
telling Brown the reason for the stop. 143 Moreover, even though the
trooper had decided to release Brown with a warning, the trooper gave
her no indication that she was free to go (or would shortly be free to
go).144 Instead, the trooper asked Brown to consent to a search of her

134. Id. at 613–14.
135. Id. at 614; Nason, 102 P.3d at 971.
136. Schaffer, 988 P.2d at 616; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
227 (1973) (finding that when consent justifies search, consent will be
determined by voluntariness through the totality of the circumstances).
137. 182 P.3d 624 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
138. Id. at 626.
139. Id. at 634.
140. Id. at 625.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 627.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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person and her vehicle for drugs.145
Because Brown remained ignorant of the reason for the stop, she
did not know the basis for the trooper’s assertion of authority over
her.146 Consequently, even if Brown had been familiar with search and
seizure law, Brown had no way of knowing if she had the right to refuse
the trooper’s request—indeed she had no way of knowing if the
trooper’s request to conduct a search was indeed a request or was,
instead, simply a polite phrasing of a command. Despite the promptness
of the trooper’s request, Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution
prohibited him from asking for permission to search the car.147
The court distinguished the circumstances in Brown from U. S.
Supreme Court cases holding that “absent specific coercive
circumstances beyond those that normally attend a traffic stop, the
motorist’s ensuing consent to search will be deemed voluntary.”148 The
court noted that numerous commentators have criticized the Supreme
Court’s holdings.149 Because the motorist in Brown remained ignorant of
the reason for the stop and of the officer’s authority over her, and
because the request for consent to search was nothing more than a
fishing expedition unsupported by any individualized suspicion, the
court recognized that these coercive circumstances precluded a finding
of voluntary consent.150
The same coercive circumstances recognized in Brown apply to
requests for identification from passengers. Although the passengers
may be aware of the reason for the traffic stop, they remain ignorant of
the basis for the officer’s authority over them. It is not a crime, nor is it
suspicious, to be a passenger in a car that is stopped for a traffic
violation. 151 The request for passenger identification serves no logical
purpose related to the traffic offense; however, a passenger might
assume that the passengers are required by law to comply with the
request, especially where the officer makes the request of the driver and
the passengers simultaneously. Like the driver in Brown, a passenger
would have “no way of knowing if the trooper’s request . . . was indeed

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 634.
148. Id. at 625.
149. Id. at 632.
150. Id. at 634.
151. State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088, 1095 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (“Defendant
was present solely by virtue of the coincidence [that] he was a passenger in the
vehicle stopped for a malfunctioning license plate light, and under the
circumstances, giving the officer no suspicion whatsoever of criminal activity or
danger of harm from weapons.”).
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a request or was, instead, simply a polite way of phrasing a
command.”152
Although a passenger may freely provide identification to an
officer, his or her compliance with the officer’s request is mere
“acquiescence to apparent lawful authority,” not a voluntary, uncoerced
consent to a warrantless search. Like the driver in Brown, 153 the
passenger has no way of knowing the officer’s purpose behind
requesting identification, and no way of knowing if he or she has a
lawful right to refuse. When law enforcement temporarily detains a
vehicle they seize the passenger. “In circumstances pregnant with
coercion,” an officer’s “direct request [that] the defendant search for and
produce a document”154 vitiates any consent implied by a passenger’s
voluntary relinquishment of his or her identification.
3. Investigative Stop
Upon personally observing a traffic infraction, a police officer has
probable cause for a traffic stop. 155 The principles of Terry v. Ohio 156
require that “a traffic stop ‘must be temporary and [must] last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” 157 A police
officer’s conduct during the stop must be “‘reasonably related in scope’
to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. The stop
becomes unreasonable—and thus constitutionally invalid—if the
duration, manner, or scope of the investigation exceeds these
boundaries.”158
Alaska has not followed the example of federal courts in giving law
enforcement officers carte blanche investigatory powers during a
routine traffic stop. The Alaska Court of Appeals has not adopted the
holding of Maryland v. Wilson 159 that a police officer may order
passengers out of a car during a traffic stop without any additional
justification. 160 The Alaska Supreme Court has held that “a licensing
152. Brown, 182 P.3d at 634. Some courts have found that an officer may ask
for identification as long as the circumstances do not suggest that a reasonable
person would feel obligated to comply. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 919 So.2d 702,
704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
153. Brown, 182 P.3d at 627.
154. People v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
155. Bessette v. State, 145 P.3d 592, 594 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); Williams v.
State, 853 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
156. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
157. Brown, 182 P.3d at 625 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(plurality opinion)).
158. Id.
159. 519 U.S. 408, 414–415 (1997).
160. See Erickson v. State, 141 P.3d 356, 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (declining
to decide whether the Alaska Constitution grants greater protection on this issue
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statute cannot be used as a means for obtaining information or evidence
not related to the licensing requirement.”161 And the Alaska Court of
Appeals has held that a lawful investigatory stop may not be extended
without reasonable suspicion solely “in the hope that something might
turn up.”162
During a traffic stop, an officer may ask the motorist to produce
“routine driving documents” without unreasonably expanding the
scope or duration of the traffic stop. 163 Routine driving documents
include a driver’s license, proof of insurance, and the vehicle’s
registration.164 A computer check to verify the validity of routine driving
documents does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a
valid traffic stop.165
However, the request for identification and criminal background
check on a passenger’s license unreasonably expands the scope, and
therefore the duration, of the traffic stop. Any unconstitutional search or
seizure, even one lasting only a matter of seconds,166 is a violation of an
individual’s rights.167 Although the total length of the stop may not be
per se excessive, any time spent on matters outside the scope of the stop
is unreasonable. Thus, even when a request for the passenger’s
identification may have been made within minutes of the initial stop and
the criminal check could have been completed within minutes, any time
spent on actions not reasonably related to the initial stop would extend
in light of case-specific reasons that justified ordering the passenger out of the
car).
161. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 839 (Alaska 1975).
162. Cousins v. State, 2006 WL 1897112, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. July 12, 2006);
see also Kaban, supra note 94, at 1320–24.
163. Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage, 112 P.3d 676, 678 (Alaska Ct. App.
2005) (quoting United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2001)).
164. Id.
165. Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing Brown
v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 629 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008)); see also Clark, 112 P.3d at 678
(“‘[I]t does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a valid traffic stop
for an officer to prolong the stop to immediately investigate and determine if the
driver is entitled to continue to operate the vehicle by checking the status of the
driver’s license, insurance, and vehicle registration[.]’”) (emphasis in original).
166. See, e.g., State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 805 (N.J. 2008) (“An NCIC query
can produce a response in approximately .05 seconds.”) (citing Press Release,
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 40 Years of NCIC (Jan. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/40-years-of-ncic).
167. Cf. People v. Spicer, 203 CAL. RPTR. 599, 601–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(citation omitted); see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 6.4.3.1 (2008) (noting that investigative
techniques and computer checks in particular “prolong the length of a stop until
the results have been obtained, allowing the police—if the officer so chooses—to
exploit that period of time to engage in conversation with the detainee . . . and
otherwise obtain incriminating evidence”).
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the stop unnecessarily in violation of an individual’s rights.
A blanket request for passengers’ identification is not “‘reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first
place.’”168 The traffic stop is justified by the officer’s direct observation
of a traffic violation. No evidence of the infraction could be gleaned
from a passenger’s identification. Although an officer could conceivably
collect witness information in anticipation that witnesses must later be
summonsed to traffic court or another legal proceeding arising out of
the police-citizen contact, 169 the officer could obtain that information
merely by asking the passengers for their names and contact
information, and perhaps even by a request for identification for these
purposes. But seizing the identification card and then conducting a
warrant check on the passenger goes beyond the scope of witness
identification. Moreover, this justification is particularly thin where the
officer does not issue a citation to the driver for the original traffic
violation, and there are to be no hearings or further proceedings
necessitating witness participation. The passengers, as a practical matter,
have no witness value and are almost never subpoenaed to traffic
court.170
C.

No Generalized Concern for Officer Safety Outweighs
Individual Privacy Rights

Some other jurisdictions allow the request for passenger
identification on the theory that officer safety concerns justify asking all
passengers for identification during a traffic stop. Although there are
significant threats to officer safety that could potentially arise during a
traffic stop, a generalized concern for “officer safety” may not be used as
a means of nullifying a constitutional right. As the New Mexico court in
168. Brown, 182 P.3d at 625 (internal citation omitted).
169. See State v. Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72, 81–82 (Wis. 2000) (“[T]here is a
general public interest in attempting to obtain identifying information from
witnesses to police-citizen encounters. If witnesses are willing to identify
themselves, they may later be able to assist police in locating the person who
violated the law. If questions later arise about police conduct during the stop,
passengers may be able to provide information about what occurred during the
stop.”); State v. Hoskins, 2008 N.H. Super. LEXIS 7, at *13–15 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Mar. 7, 2008). But see State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 510–11 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) (rejecting the idea that obtaining contact information of witnesses justifies
a warrant check; “[t]he officers could have taken the information they needed
from appellant’s identification and returned it to him. They did not have to run a
warrants check to get his name and address.”).
170. See Castle v. State, 999 P.2d 169, 173–74 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (noting
that the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent
circumstances are present).
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Affsprung held:
Defendant’s mere presence in a vehicle with a faulty license
plate light adds nothing of significance that causes this even
minimal intrusion to tip the balance in favor of public or
officer safety over individual [Article I, Section 22] privacy. To
permit law enforcement officers to ask for and to check out
passenger identification under these circumstances opens a
door to the type of indiscriminate, oppressive, fearsome
authoritarian practices and tactics of those in power that the
[search and seizure clause] was designed to prohibit.171
An officer’s request for a passenger’s identification and a
subsequent criminal check of the passenger expands the scope of the
stop, changes the target of the stop, and prolongs the stop.172 A policy
that allows officers to indiscriminately obtain identification from
passengers during a traffic stop encourages the systematic infringement
of privacy rights. Officers have every incentive to perpetuate this
systematic infringement because their fishing expedition may yield an
occasional warrant or probationer. The officer loses nothing if the
criminal check reveals nothing of interest, but in such an exchange the
privacy rights of individuals are violated.

CONCLUSION
The Alaska Constitution, in addition to its explicit guarantee of
privacy, provides more protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures than exists in some other jurisdictions. These provisions secure
a broader right to privacy than that of the Federal Constitution.
Because the right to privacy is not absolute, a police officer would
have authority to request a passenger’s identification where the officer
has reasonable suspicion of criminality, the passenger has personally
committed a traffic infraction, or the passenger intends to take
possession of the vehicle after the driver’s arrest. But an officer has no
authority under the Alaska Constitution to request a passenger’s
identification during a routine traffic stop without reasonable suspicion
of criminality or other circumstantial justification. The request cannot be
justified by the traffic stop, by a generalized concern for officer safety, or

171. State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088, 1094–95 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
172. See United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding
the scope and duration of a traffic stop must be reasonably related to the
circumstances that led to the stop in the first place).
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by a vague argument about collecting witness contact information. And
although the passenger may in theory have a right to refuse the
“request,” the inherent imbalance of power present in a traffic stop
renders the passenger’s seemingly voluntary consent the product of
coercion.
The Alaska Constitution does not permit law enforcement officers
to request identification from vehicle passengers during a routine traffic
stop without reasonable suspicion of criminality or other circumstantial
justification. For routine traffic stops in which there is no independent
justification, a request for passenger identification is constitutionally
invalid. Although such a request may be valid under the United States
Constitution and under the law of other states, the Alaska Constitution
provides privacy and search and seizure protections for passengers that
prohibit such a request without independent justification.

